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ABSTRACT 
The strategies that bureaucratic actors employ to secure resources are the result of a complex 
interplay between motivational states and environmental conditions. The strategies employed by 
bureaucrats to secure resources are now best understood as heuristics.  Heuristics that may be 
adaptive in securing resources under some conditions may be maladaptive under different 
environmental circumstances (Gigerenzer 2000; 2008). This study reviews the various strategies 
employed by bureaucrats to secure financial resources through the lens of Downs’ typology of 
bureaucrats to determine the fundamental heuristics the successful strategies employ.  We sought 
inspiration from both the extant literature and models of bureaucratic behaviour within 
organizations beginning with Downs (1967) and continuing with the work of Bowling, Cho, and 
Wright (2004), and the methodological innovations afforded by agent-based modelling.  By making 
certain basic assumptions regarding decision-making heuristics, we show a remarkable 
consistency between Downs, Bowling and her colleagues, and our own findings. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
For more than 50 years public administration scholars have attempted to examine the strategies and 
attitudes of bureaucrats regarding the acquisition of budgetary resources (Wildavsky, 1964). Early 
public choice theorists (Downs,1967; Niskanen, 1971) claimed that bureaucrats were motivated 
significantly by self-interest and were budget maximizers seeking to always increase their 
budgetary allocations. These theorists assumed that bureaucratic agents act in a manner analogous 
to firms in a competitive market place, where profit maximization is the goal.  
More recent examinations of the attitudes of public managers toward budget increases do not 
support the single-minded budget maximizing claims of the public choice theorists.  Dolan’s (2000, 
p. 42) sample of Senior Executive Service members found that these senior managers preferred less 
government spending than the public in general and preferred less spending “…even on issues that 
fall within their own department’s jurisdictions.” Bowling, Cho, and Wright’s (2004) longitudinal 
study of state-level agency heads revealed a spectrum of attitudes regarding budget increases. 
These agency heads revealed attitudes toward budget increases ranging from no increase to 
increases to 15 percent or more. In a recent experiment, Moynihan (2013) found that individuals 
scoring high in public service motivation did not advocate for significantly higher increases in 
budgets relative to others. 
These divergent views on the budget seeking behavior and attitudes of public managers result in 
very different views of the motivational sets of bureaucrats. The public choice perspective sees 
bureaucrats as fundamentally self-interested in the pursuit of budgetary resources. The more recent 
literature offers a more complex view of the motivations of bureaucrats with regard to budget 
seeking behavior. This literature suggests that there is a wide spectrum of attitudes concerning 
budget seeking behavior among bureaucrats. Bureaucracy is not seen as a monolith of selfish actors 
pursing their economic self-interest but rather as a mixture of attitudes toward seeking financial 
resources. 
The debate over whether bureaucrats are budget utility maximizers or display a spectrum of 
attitudes with regard to increasing budgets does not inform us, however, as to which resource 
seeking strategies are most effective in obtaining resources. Budget allocations remain as signals as 
to not only what an agency can accomplish but also signal the preferences of government itself. 
The strategies that government managers use to receive budgetary allocations must also be viewed 
within the light of environmental factors. The context of a strategy is critical if a strategy is to 
succeed (Bryson, 2004). 
A major, if not the predominant context, for public administration in the last 40 years is the public 
sector’s economic and institutional reality of declining resources. The reality of resource 
constrained environments should thus serve as one primary context for examining how 
bureaucrats’ strategies for acquiring resources interact with such environs.  Perhaps more 
importantly, it is important to understand if resource constraints serve to change the mix of 
bureaucratic actor types and thus the mix of strategies toward resource seeking.  
This paper seeks to answer two primary questions. First, which bureaucratic types, defined by their 
resource seeking strategies, are most effective in capturing financial resources under conditions of 
resource constraints? Second, does the initial mix of bureaucratic types change, over time, as more 
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successful resource capture strategies replace less successful strategies in a resource constrained 
environment? 
We present the results of an experiment embedded in an agent-based model. This model imbues 
agents with differing strategies, enacted through heuristics that guide the agents toward resource 
acquisition.  The agents are placed in an environment of constrained resources as a means to 
examine which bureaucratic type, as defined by its basic strategy and its associated heuristics is 
most effective in acquiring resources. The model thus provides a determination of which 
bureaucratic types and their associated heuristics are likely to thrive in and inhabit a resource 
constrained environment.  
While the strategies of public administrators may vary in the details of their origin, Gigerenzer 
(2008) has detailed why simple rules of thumb often outperform complex decision-making models. 
In many complex scenarios, “simple rules give concrete guidance without being overly 
prescriptive” (Sull and Eisenhardt 2015, p. 25). The approach embodied in the model presented in 
this work is premised on the decision-making literature (Gigerenzer, 2008; Sull and Eisenhadt, 
2015) that reveals that simple heuristics are both more effective and more typical of actual 
decision-maker behavior relative to more complex strategies, especially under conditions of 
uncertainty and numerous alternatives (Gigerenzer, 2014). 
Downs’ classic model (1967) of bureaucratic types provides a foundational template for selecting 
the fundamental bureaucratic types that populate the simulation. These fundamental types each 
present distinct strategies for navigating a landscape of reduced resources. Bowling, Cho, and 
Wright’s (2004) (BCW henceforth) more recent application of Downs’ typology provides an 
empirical foundation for the strategies each bureaucratic type employs toward budget increases. 
We apply a model combining Downs’ view of the expected resource seeking behavior of each type 
toward budgetary acquisition with BCW (2004) longitudinal data of the attitudes of state agency 
heads toward budget increases. BCW (2004) study results thus serve as an empirical foundation for 
determining the initial proportion of bureaucratic types that populate the simulation and their 
associated strategies for resource acquisition in the simulated environment. 
This paper is comprised of six sections. The first section reviews the literature examining the 
motivations of public managers with the particular contextual relevance to budgetary behavior and 
dynamics. The second section details the typologies of bureaucrats produced by Downs (1967) and 
BCW (2004). The third section details the general elements of agent-based models. We next 
provide a description of our model in the ODD (Overview, Design concepts, and Details) protocol 
format (Railsback & Grimm, 2012). The fifth section reports the results of the simulation and the 
final section provides a discussion of the simulation results. 
2. THE DYNAMICS OF BUREAUCRATIC MOTIVATION 
Early research on the budgetary motivations of public managers viewed them as devoted to budget 
maximization. Wildavsky’s work (1964) created the assumption that public managers attempt to 
maximize budgets by using the various strategies he detailed. In later works, public choice theory 
served as foundation for some of the early research on the topic. Downs’ (1967) saw bureaucrats as 
budget maximizers. He saw this as especially true for agencies in the early years of their existence 
that were likely dominated by (Downs, 1967, p. 4) “Climbers” seeking to attain status and power 
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through budget expansion. Niskanen’s (1971) early theoretical work was also premised on a public 
choice assumption that public managers are rational utility maximizers (Conybeare, 1984) who are 
consistently devoted to securing larger budgets for their agencies or units.  
Later empirical analyses of the public choice assumptions concerning bureaucratic behavior 
questioned Niskanen’s view that bureaucrats’ budget preferences are singularly devoted to 
increasing budgets. Conybeare’s (1984) work exploring inter-agency competition showed that 
competition between agencies reduces the monopoly power that necessarily expedites budget 
maximization. Dolan’s (2000) study of members of the U.S. Federal Senior Executive Service 
(SES) also did not support Niskanen’s budget maximization theory. Dolan (2000) found that SES 
members did not demand budget increases even for their own agencies. 
BCW (2004) examined data gathered over four decades from the American State Administrators 
Project (ASAP) in an effort to determine the budget preferences of state level managers. These data 
reveal considerable variation in the sampled managers’ views regarding the expansion of their own 
agency’s program and their views of increases in overall state budget expenditures. In particular, 
the decade of the 1990s showed distinct increases in the number of administrators who showed no 
desire for overall State budget expansions. The decade of the 1990s also showed a clear decline in 
the proportion of sampled administrators seeking large budget increases, in this case 15 percent or 
more, for their own agencies (BCW, 2004). Thus, the empirical literature reveals that public 
managers are more than singularly motivated automatons with a preference set dominated only by 
those seeking increased budgets. However, BCW (2004, p. 495) did find that the majority of the 
administrators in the ASAP samples, ranging from 62 percent in 1964 to 56 percent in 1998, 
favored both the expansion of their own agencies and state-level budgets. Thus, while many public 
managers may be budget maximizers, the public choice perspective presents only a partial picture 
of the actual heterogeneity revealed in government managers’ budget preferences (Dolan 2000; 
BCW, 2004). 
2.1. Typologies of Heterogeneous Administrators  
Downs’ study of bureaucratic decision-making provided a classic taxonomy of bureaucratic 
behaviors that provides a model that is still useful today (Kiel, 2005). Although Downs describes 
nine different motivations within the “bureaucrat’s utility function” he identifies “five ideal types” 
of behavioral abstractions that “provide insights into the way bureaus actually behave” (1967, p. 
88). The characteristics described by Downs break down into two primary groups: those that are 
driven by personal self-interest and those with mixed motives. The self-interested group includes 
the two subtypes of Climbers and Conservers. Climbers are interested in ascending the 
organizational hierarchy to increase their own power, prestige, and resources to the almost 
complete exclusion of other goals. Conservers, on the other hand, are interested in securing their 
current position of power, prestige, and resources and are not interested in taking risks to 
accumulate more resources. 
Mixed-motive officials constitute the second of the primary groups. The mixed-motive officials 
possess goals that contain elements of both self-interest and altruism. Within this group are three of 
Downs’ subtypes: Advocates, Zealots, and Statesmen. Advocates are loyal to a modestly broad set 
of functions and in particular to the segment or department of the bureau to which they identify 
with or belong. They seek power to further the policies and wellbeing of their current organization, 
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unit or function. Zealots are similar to Advocates but have a narrower agenda. They seek power to 
effect policies, considered sacrosanct, to which they are fiercely loyal as well as seeking power for 
its own sake. Zealots have an almost single minded focus on the furtherance of these policies. 
Statesmen, however, are the antithesis of the Zealots in that their loyalties lie with society. They 
seek power to improve the general welfare and in doing so “closely resemble the theoretical 
bureaucrats of public administration textbooks” (Downs, 1967, p. 89). 
A more recent typology of administrators’ motivations was developed by BCW (2004). Their 
review of survey data from the American State Administrators Project resulted in their typology of 
administrators’ motivations based on administrators’ preferences for or against budget increases.  
The BCW (2004) typology also reveals heterogeneous motivations among administrators and their 
preferences toward budget increases. In particular, these motivations are based on administrators’ 
preferences for increasing or decreasing their own agency budgets and for increasing or decreasing 
the entire State level budget. The typology consists of four administrator types beginning with 
Abiders who prefer no increases in either their own agency’s or the State’s budget. A second 
group, the Altruists, prefer expanding the State budget but not their own agency’s funding. A third 
group, the Advocates, favor increasing their own agency level funding but not increased state level 
funding.  Finally, BCW (2004) view Aggrandizers of varying intensity who prefer both their 
agency level and State level budget increases. Thus, BCW (2004) identify a continuum of 
administrator preferences ranging from “minimizers” willing to accept no increase to their own 
budgets to “maximizers” who consistently seek increased budgets. 
3. AGENT BASED MODELING  
Axelrod (1997) offers a rationale for the use of computer simulation in the social sciences. One of 
his basic premises concerning agent-based modelling is that such simulation “is a way of doing 
thought experiments” (Axelrod, 1997, p. 4). Holland (1995) describes the idea that agent-based 
models could be used in a manner similar to flight simulators allowing the possible outcomes of a 
process change or intervention to be explored in the benign environment of a computer model prior 
to implementation in the real world.  One of the chief aims is to achieve parsimony, while also 
faithfully capturing the essence of the phenomena in question. 
Agent based modelling (ABM) is a simulation tool for uncovering the connections between the 
micro-motives and macro-outcomes in a complex environment. One form of agent-based 
modelling is participatory modelling. Participatory modelling is essentially a role-play exercise 
with highly defined behavioural characteristics for the players. The players or agents can 
characterize actors in a scenario or they can represent more abstract types of agents such as parts or 
warehouses in a supply chain (North & Macal, 2007). The main assumption is that the behavioural 
attributes for the agents are determined a priori to the simulation and tested for their ability to 
emulate historical outcomes. Once these attributes have been established and tested via a simple 
participatory or desktop simulation, more elaborate models can be developed in a modular fashion.  
Agent-based models are comprised of two essential elements. First, agents exist that are imbued 
with various attributes for navigating their environments. Second, the agents inhabit and traverse a 
landscape. The landscape may represent human organizations, cultural innovations such as markets 
or the virtual representation of the topography of a geographic region. It is this combination of the 
6                                                                                        McCaskill, Kiel, Elliott, Harrington 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Int. j. soc. sci. humanit. educ.                                                                                     ISSN 2521-0041 
heuristics that drive the behaviour of agents and the composition and characteristics of the 
landscape that produce the dynamics and the outcomes of the simulation.   
4. THE AGENT BASED MODEL PRESENTED IN THE ODD PROTOCOL 
4.1. Purpose  
It is not possible to test directly the psychological state of bureaucratic agents which for the 
purposes of our study represent agency or bureau heads.  Rather, we assume that the fundamental 
postures agents enact are based on heuristics toward resource acquisition.  Faced with the need to 
make decisions about which strategies to follow, bureaucratic agents employ heuristics consistent 
with their basic postures, with what they have learned over time, or which they develop by 
mimicking others they believe are successful.  Such heuristics, or “cognitive maps” (Gigerenzer, 
2000; Gigerenzer, 2008, pp. 3-45), provide a means for bureaucratic agents to navigate the 
uncertainty of bureaucratic politics. 
Such heuristic devices for guiding organizational behaviour are based upon what agents have 
concluded are their preferred strategies for adapting to an uncertain environment.  Over time, as the 
environment changes, agents may evolve different heuristic strategies.  But humans are also 
cognitive misers; they tend to conserve cognitive energy (Fiske & Taylor, 1984). To change 
heuristics requires a significant expenditure of cognitive energy. Of course, in the real world, 
bureaucratic types may play multiple strategies simultaneously, or may alternate strategies over 
short periods of time.  We make no such assumptions here, since we seek to make the analysis 
more tractable. With these aspects in mind, we utilize a model design very similar to the NetLogo 
Wealth Distribution Model (Wilensky, 1998), to determine whether agents operating under a small 
set of relatively simple attributes can accurately simulate empirical findings regarding the 
preferences of bureaucrats in budget environments. Our model is built in NetLogo with its familiar 
landscape, patch, and turtle protocols (Wilensky, 1999). 
One important point is that the agents in this model retain their initial heuristics throughout the 
simulation. In other words, the agents maintain a stable set of simple heuristics toward resource 
acquisition.  Moreover, we assume, for the purposes of this study, all the agents are of equal 
authority within the organization.  We assume the bureaucratic agents, the agency heads, operate in 
an environment of rough equality.  While this assumption may not be strictly realistic at any one 
point in time where the political winds may temporarily favour one agency over another, we think 
that over time, shifting political fortunes result in a rough balance. The assumptions made 
regarding the agents’ decision making assumes, consistent with Gigerenzer (2008), that the agents 
are boundedly rational, a common assumption in such situations.  Importantly, however, here we 
assume, again, consistent with Gigerenzer, that the decision-making strategies, the agents’ 
heuristics in this case, are adaptive and efficient.  Indeed, Gigerenzer’s “fast and frugal” heuristics 
produce efficient behaviors while requiring agents to ignore certain kinds of information.  As 
defined by Gigerenzer (2008, p. 22) “A fast and frugal heuristic is a strategy, conscious or 
unconscious, that searches for minimal information and consists of building blocks that exploit 
evolved capacities and environmental structures.” This contrasts with Kahneman and Tversky 
(1979; 1996) who assumed that such reliance on shortcuts can be maladaptive and produce 
decisions that result in poor outcomes. 
Successful Resource Seeking Strategies…   7 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Int. j. soc. sci. humanit. educ.                                                                                     ISSN 2521-0041 
In our model, we operationalize the heuristic Gigerenzer and Brighton (2009) describe as “take-
the-best.” According to Gigerenzer and Brighton: 
Take-the-best is a member of the one-good-reason family of heuristics because of its stopping 
heuristics: The search is stopped after ﬁnding the ﬁrst cue that enables an inference to be made. 
Take-the-best simpliﬁes decision-making by both stopping after the ﬁrst cue and by ordering cues 
unconditionally by validity. Both these simpliﬁcations have been observed in the behaviour of 
humans and other animals but routinely interpreted as signs of irrationality rather than adaptive 
behaviour (Gigerenzer & Brighton 2009, p.113). 
This assumption in our model that our simulated agents’ use “heuristics” for navigating budgetary 
acquires is also supported by research examining how managers employ strategy. Davis, 
Eisenhardt and Bingham (2009) found that simple heuristics for strategy are efficacious in dynamic 
environments. Bingham and Eisenhardt (2011, p. 1437) discovered that private sector managers 
apply heuristics to acquire business opportunities in a manner that,” … results in a deliberately 
small, yet increasingly strategic, portfolio of heuristics.” Furthermore, given the extent of the 
cognitive demands placed on managers it is reasonable to assume that relatively simple heuristics 
are employed when attempting to acquire resources. 
4.2. Entities, State Variables, and Scales 
There are five types of entities in this model: four bureaucratic subtypes of mobile agents, and 
immobile patches containing varying amounts of resources. The simulation environments the 
mobile agents navigate are made up of the patches in a square grid measuring 150 by 150 patches. 
Each of the patches has one state variable: its amount of resources. The simulations last for 30-time 
steps (ticks) with each time step simulating one budgetary year. The total number of each agent 
type is captured at the end of the simulation run (30-time steps). Simulations should rely on valid 
empirical data when such data are available. The survey data presented by BCW (2004) identified 
the relative percentage of each bureaucratic type over a 30-year time frame.  Our goal was to set 
the initial proportion of the agents in the model to those identified by BCW.  This approach 
provides an initial condition, or starting point, for the simulation based on the starting point of the 
existing data.  The data shows that there were fluctuations in the relative percentages of agents over 
time and so we chose an ending point coincident with the lowest percentage of Aggrandizers to 
allow for a stable, downward trend in budgetary resources. These starting, and end points were 
chosen to provide a clear break in the resource rich environments and the resource poor 
environments. This allowed the model to run in a constant resource poor environment, providing 
the conditions we wished to observe the agents interact. The timeframe also coincides with an 
historic aggregate slowdown in state government revenue growth (BCW, 2004). 
We varied the settings for agent vision and resource needs through multiple experimental runs until 
the outcomes mirrored the changes of relative agent percentages of the ASAP data set over time. 
The Altruists had their resource needs set to the highest value.  Altruists, with their goals aligned 
with the overall wellbeing of the organization as a whole, have the highest rate of resource needs 
and thus engage the simple heuristic of requesting more resources out of concern that others may 
not get the resources they need to help the organization achieve its goals. The Altruists’ resource 
need rate was followed in descending order by the low Aggrandizers, the Abiders, and the high 
Aggrandizers. Although the motivations of the groups are disparate in orientation, all these types 
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require relatively moderate levels of resources to reach the budget goals associated with their 
resource seeking behaviour. Advocates had the lowest relative resource need rate. To reproduce 
these changes within the model, the resource need variable proved to be the strongest indicator of 
agent relative success. 
With the agent attributes and environmental variables established, the simulation was run in the 
following manner. To remain true to the findings of BCW (2004), the model’s initial populations of 
agent types were set to mirror the proportions of the ASAP data from 1964, the initial year of the 
study, and the agent attributes were adjusted until the model outcomes coincided with the 
proportions of the 1978 year of the study. These points were chosen to examine the impact of 
public preference for agency growth reductions beginning in 1964—the ending of a period of 
relative high resource availability—to 1978, the year California’s Proposition 1 was enacted by 
voters (BCW 2004). This approach resulted in initial starting proportions for the simulation of 200 
low Aggrandizers, 190 Abiders, 120 Advocates, 400 high Aggrandizers, and 60 Altruists. Budget 
reduction was set at zero.  We ran this simulation 1,000 times to ensure consistent and stable 
outcomes for the agent subtypes. All of the following run series were conducted with up to a 35 
percent budget reduction from the initial baseline. The absolute reduction amount of the budget 
amounts is not as germane to the functioning of the model as is the more subjective terminology of 
modest, or severe budget reductions.    
Table 1. Agent Types, Postures Toward Budgetary Growth and Heuristics 
Downs’ 
Types 
Associated  
Bowling et 
al. Type 
Bowling Types 
Postures toward 
Budgetary growth 
Propensity 
Toward 
Strategic 
Maneuvering 
(Very Low to 
Low = take-
the-best) 
The Agent’s 
Need for 
Resources 
(Operationalized 
posture toward 
budgetary 
growth) 
Take 
Resources 
from 
Other 
Agents 
Climber Low 
Aggrandizer  
Agency Expansion 
– Yes; 
State Expansion- 
Yes 
 Very Low  Moderate Yes 
Climber High 
Aggrandizer 
Agency Expansion 
– Yes; 
State Expansion- 
Yes 
Moderate Moderate Yes 
Conserver Abider  Agency 
Expansion- No; 
State Expansion - 
No 
Low Moderate No 
Advocate Advocate  Agency Expansion 
– Yes 
State Expansion - 
No 
Very Low Low  No 
Statesman Altruist  Agency Expansion 
– No; 
State Expansion - 
Yes 
High High  No 
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4.3. Process Overview and Scheduling  
There are four processes that occur for turtles (the mobile agents representing the bureaucrats) in 
the model: the agents look for resources, they move to the resources, they consume the resources, 
and if they do not find enough resources for their needs, they die. When death occurs, the agent is 
removed from further iterations of the simulation. The patches, the stationary locations that hold 
the resources needed by the mobile agents, hold varying amounts of resources that are randomly 
distributed and diffused around the simulation. The turtles can move one space and the patches 
resources recharge to their initial state during each iteration (or tick) of the simulation.  
4.4. Design Concepts  
The basic attributes of the agents consist of the three elements of vision, resource needs, and 
willingness to take resources from another agent (See Table 1). Vision is the relative distance 
within the landscape that an agent can see resources. This attribute represents the sweep of the 
perspective the agent types have regarding their environment as well as adding a temporal aspect to 
the agents’ heuristics. An agent with greater vision can see across a larger scope of the landscape to 
identify resource pools, but since an agent can only move one unit (patch) per time increment, it 
allows the agent with greater vision to have a longer-term view.  This agent attribute allows the 
model to simulate the take-the-best approach by limiting the number of choices an agent can see. 
Altruists who seek only to increase total State spending, presumably for the betterment of all 
agencies, are thus imbued with the highest vision valued at six; a long-term perspective. This 
means Altruists can see as far as six patches in all directions on the landscape from their current 
location to identify resources and therefore utilize a more complex decision-making process. 
Advocates and low Aggrandizers have the lowest vision due to their immediate need to acquire 
resources for their own agency and thus can see only one patch, or increment, from their current 
location that equates with them using the take-the-best heuristic. The concepts of objectives and 
prediction are not explicitly considered because organizational survival is presumed a priori to be 
the objective of the bureaucratic agents. 
Sensing: Agent vision enables the movement of the agents on the landscape. At the beginning of 
each simulation run, agents are randomly located on patches, or grids, of space on the landscape. 
Agents navigate the landscape by turning on their initial patch, identifying the closest pool of 
resources based on the extent of their vision and moving toward that pool of resources. Agents with 
greater vision can then identify resource pools further away from their current location. This gives 
these agents a larger view of the resource pools available as opposed to their less “visionary” 
counterparts. This vision constraint provides a proxy for the heuristic the agent uses to implement 
its budgetary strategy. Lower vision equates with the “take the best” heuristic in the battle for 
scarce resources. If an agent ‘sees’ distant resources but is unable to get to them before exhausting 
its on-hand metabolic resources, it dies and is removed from the simulation. 
Resource need refers to the amount of resources desired and varies between agent types on a 
graduated scale from high to low (See Table 1). The resource need of the agent is sustained by 
“harvesting” resources necessary to maintain the desired expenditure level of its agency. Thus, 
agent types with high resource needs must acquire equally high levels of budgetary resources. For 
example, an Altruist has a high level of desire for resources to ensure that all agencies have their 
needs met while the Advocate’s resource needs are lower due to this agent’s narrower interest in its 
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own agency’s budget increases. Resource needs in this case is a proxy for the simple desire of 
whether to have a lower or higher budget need relative to the budgetary process.  
Interaction: The willingness of an agent type to take resources from another is represented by the 
agent attribute of either avoiding a resource containing patch on the landscape where another agent 
is already harvesting resources or competing with them on the same patch. According to Downs 
(1967), the agent type of Climbers, low and high Aggrandizers in this case, are more willing to risk 
agitating others to gain the resources they need to accomplish their goals than are the other agent 
types. The agent attributes are then reinforced such that these two Aggrandizing types will clash 
with other agent subtypes and compete for resources on a patch, causing the Abiders, Advocates 
and Altruists to move to a new patch without an agent on it. Abiders and Altruists will also avoid 
patches that are already populated with low Aggrandizers or high Aggrandizers. If a low 
Aggrandizer and a high Aggrandizer both find themselves in the same resource space, they will 
consume resources at equal speed until the resources are exhausted.  
Stochasticity: The environment or landscape designed for this simulation has the following 
characteristics. The allocation of resources through the organization (the environment for the 
simulation) is randomly situated on the landscape at each iteration (time step) of the simulation. 
This provides adequate variation in the relative success of the agents in capturing resources to 
determine a stable range of agent behaviour even when the budgetary environment is altered.  
The next environmental variable is the ‘total resource allocation replenishment’ for the 
organization. The simulation control allows for a reduction in the number of resources that are 
replenished within the next fiscal cycle which, in this model, simulates an overall decrease in the 
funding available for all organizations. Finally, the number of ‘ticks’ or cycles each represent one 
year. The ‘ticks’ within the simulation are limited to thirty, simulating an abstract bureaucratic 
career life. The logic diagram for the simulation is presented in appendix (1). 
4.5. Initialization 
When the model is initialized, the mobile agents are randomly distributed around the landscape as 
are the levels of resources contained on each of the patches or grid squares that the mobile agents 
occupy. The available, budgetary resources are constrained, and these decreased resources become 
more concentrated in certain areas leaving other areas on the landscape bare. If an agent spends too 
much time in a resource barren area, the individual agent of that type (dies) is removed from the 
simulation, thus reducing the number of agents of that type in the simulation. Agents are thus either 
relatively successful or unsuccessful at gathering resources adequate to sustain their metabolic 
needs.  
Since individual agents that cannot harvest resources adequate to maintain their resource needs are 
eliminated from that iteration of the simulation, each following simulation run then uses the 
remaining sum of the number of each agent type. Since the simulation has a stochastic element in 
the initial positioning of the agents as well as the distribution of resources, we ran the simulation 
1,000 times from start to finish, ensuring we do not allow outlier events to skew the resulting 
averages.  We then take the average of each agent type of the 1,000 simulation runs to accumulate 
a final average of the agent types that survive. Since agents leave, but do not join during a 
simulation run, the total number of each agent type is either retained or decreases during those 
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runs. In short, the agent type capturing the resources to stay in the simulation has the best fitness 
strategy. 
Input data: the environment is assumed to be constant (resource constrained) throughout the 
simulated timeframe, so the model has no input data other than the initial parameters and attributes 
for resource provision. 
4.6. Sub-models  
The vision sub-model defines how the agents decide to move. The agents can look horizontally and 
vertically up to vision patches but cannot look diagonally at all. The agents choose their direction 
of travel based upon the grids containing the most assets within their allotted vision range. The 
movement sub-model then has the agents move one grid and harvest the resources contained on 
that grid. If the agents do not receive enough resources on that grid to satisfy their resource need, 
they die. Two of the agent subtypes will move away from another agent if both land on the same 
grid, without taking resources from it. 
4.7. Simulation Results  
The results of the simulation run shown in Table 2. After 1,000 model runs there are definitive 
changes in the proportion of four of the five bureaucratic types. Table 2 shows that the combined 
sum of low and high-Aggrandizers / Climbers decreased from an initial state of 61.8 percent of the 
total population to 45 percent. Aggrandizers were thus reduced from a majority position on the 
landscape to that of a distinct plurality of types. Low-Aggrandizers seeking overall budget 
increases were reduced by more than 50 percent and high-Aggrandizers, seeking overall budget 
increases of more than 10 percent were reduced by 14 percent. 
On the other hand, Abiders reveal only a very slight increase in relative numbers under the 
simulated conditions. The heuristics of the Abider appear to retain a stable proportion of Abider 
agent types over the 1000 runs.  
Table 2. Simulation Results 
 
 Aggrandizer 
low 
Aggrandizer 
high 
Abiders Advocates Altruist
s 
Initial Count as 
Percent of Total 
(converted from 
Bowling et al. 1964 
data) 
20.6% 41.2% 19.6% 12.4% 6.2% 
Average as percent of 
total after 1000 model 
runs 
10.06%* 35.14%* 20.83%* 32.02%%* 1.95% 
Confidence Interval @ 
0.95 
9.96% to 
10.15% 
35.01% to 
35.26% 
20.72% to 
20.92% 
31.91% to 
32.13% 
1.90% 
to 
1.99% 
Change in Proportion 
of Agent Type from 
Initial Count 
51.15% -14.71% 6.26% 158.25% -
68.54% 
   * p < .05 
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The simulation results show a 19.6 percent increase in Advocates increasing this type from an 
initial state of 12.4 percent to finally comprising 32 percent of the total population of bureaucratic 
types. The Advocates’ heuristics of “take the best,” minimize the need for resources, and do not 
fight with other agents over resources resulted in a 158 percent increase in this type.  
We calculated confidence intervals using the distribution of the means for each run around the total 
mean for each type. The simulation results had the Advocates make not only significant, but also 
consistent gains relative to the other types. In Table 2, the confidence interval for the Advocates 
demonstrated that through the 1,000 simulation runs, the gains relative to the other subtypes varied 
in a very narrow range (± 0.2%) over the runs.  
The Altruists were the opposite. Their small initial numbers frequently led to the elimination of the 
subtype as well as a great deal of volatility in their outcomes. The one consistent result was an 
overall decrease in the relative numbers of Altruists. The relative number of Altruists never 
increased throughout the multiple simulation runs. The heuristics of the Altruists’ revealed a very 
limited ability to capture resources.     
The agent heuristic that had the greatest moderating effect on resource need was the take-the-best 
attribute. The relative rate of success at gathering resources, and therefore surviving, was directly 
proportional to the strength of the take-the-best approach of an agent. The more an agent used the 
take-the-best approach in a resource poor environment, the more successful the agent was in 
acquiring resources. The Advocates showed the greatest increase in their proportions and 
maximized their use of the take-the-best approach while the Altruists decreased markedly with 
their use of the take-the-best attribute minimized.  
The simple attribute to minimize resource needs provided the most influence in determining agent 
type success in a resource poor environment, which was an expected outcome. The surprising 
result was the effect the take-the-best heuristic had on agent subtype success. Having the ability to 
engage in more strategic resource acquisition approaches turned out to be a detriment rather than a 
benefit in a resource poor environment. Regardless of the agent’s resource need setting (evidenced 
by multiple simulation runs with alternate settings) because while this simple attribute was one of 
the secondary influences on success, it was a necessary influence in recreating the BCW results. 
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Table 3. Sensitivity Test 
 
Initial 
Model 
Vision Plus 
(+.5) 
Vision Minus 
(-.5) 
Metabolism 
Plus (+.5) 
Metabolism 
Minus (-.5) 
Average as percent of total after 1000 model runs 
Aggrandizer 
low 10.06% 10.11% 13.20% 16.19% 21.21% 
Aggrandizer 
high 35.14% 35.11% 35.72% 21.48% 34.02% 
Abiders 20.83% 20.79% 23.42% 13.43% 17.85% 
Advocates 32.02% 32.02% 25.11% 29.21% 24.02% 
Altruists 1.95% 1.96% 2.55% 19.69% 2.89% 
Confidence Interval @ 0.95 
Aggrandizer 
low 
9.96 to 
10.15 
10.01 to 
10.20 13.10 to 13.28 
16.06 to 
16.32 21.13 to 21.29 
Aggrandizer 
high 
35.01 to 
35.26 
34.98 to 
35.24 35.61 to 35.82 
21.33 to 
21.62 33.92 to 34.12 
Abiders 
20.72 to 
20.92 
20.68 to 
20.89 23.33 to 23.49 
13.31 to 
13.54 17.76 to 17.92 
Advocates 
31.91 to 
32.13 
31.90 to 
32.14 25.01 to 25.20 
29.07 to 
29.34 23.96 to 24.08 
Altruists 
1.90 to 
1.99 1.91 to 1.99 2.51 to 2.59 
19.59 to 
19.77 2.84 to 2.93 
Change in Proportion of Agent Type from Initial Count 
Aggrandizer 
low 51.15% -50.91% -35.94% -21.39% 2.98% 
Aggrandizer 
high -14.71% -14.77% -13.30% -47.87% -17.42% 
Abiders 6.26% 6.09% 19.47% -31.47% -8.95% 
Advocates 158.25% 158.26% 102.53% 135.55% 93.75% 
 
To test the robustness of the results, we run multiple sensitivity tests by varying vision and 
metabolism in the simulations. Particularly, we increase and decrease these attributes by .5 to 
examine the differences it creates. See Table 3. As we increase vision by .5, we find that results 
remain largely unchanged compared to our initial model. Decreasing vision by .5 creates some 
noticeable differences by slightly increasing the percentage of aggrandizer and abiders and 
decreasing the percentage of advocates.  Overall, these results remain robust and similar to the 
initial model. 
On the other hand, we find that the metabolism assumption has a larger impact on the results.  
After reducing metabolism, we find that the percentage of aggrandizers increases from 10% to 21% 
at the expense of abiders and advocates. While this model differs from the initial model, the other 
factors remain robust and stable. However, we find that increasing metabolism by .5 dramatically 
increases the percentage of altruists from 2% to 20% at the expense of aggrandizer high and 
abiders.  Additionally, we find the percentage of aggrandizers increases from 10% to 16%.  
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Overall, we find that increasing metabolism by .5 leads to differing results, while the other models 
remain fairly stable and robust. 
Table 4. Sensitivity Test 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
 % Aggrandizer 
low 
% Aggrandizer 
High 
% Abiders % Advocates % Altruists 
Vision 
Minus (-.5) 
0.031** 0.006** 0.026** -0.069** 0.006** 
 (43.65) (6.76) (36.60) (90.89) (15.08) 
Vision Plus 
(+.5) 
0.001 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.71) (0.27) (0.48) (0.02) (0.12) 
Metabolism 
Minus (-.5) 
0.112** -0.011** -0.030** -0.080** 0.009** 
 (155.30) (12.95) (42.14) (105.22) (23.55) 
Metabolism 
Plus (+.5) 
0.061** -0.137** -0.074** -0.028** 0.177** 
 (85.39) (158.71) (104.53) (37.03) (443.35) 
Constant 0.101** 0.351** 0.208** 0.320** 0.020** 
 (198.16) (577.41) (416.29) (595.79) (68.96) 
R2 0.87 0.89 0.82 0.80 0.98 
N 5,000 5,000 5,000 5,000 5,000 
* p<0.05; ** p<0.01 Omitted Group for Comparison is the Initial Model 
 
To further test the sensitivity of our results, we run an OLS regression model to compare the 
different specifications. In the model, we include results from our five simulations: (1) initial 
model, (2) vision reduced by .5, (3) vision increased by .5, (4) metabolism reduced by .5, and (5) 
metabolism increased by .5. For each specification, we generate 1,000 simulation runs, so our OLS 
model includes 5,000 observations. See Table 4.  In the OLS model, we exclude the initial model to 
serve as our omitted group for comparison.  Based on our regression results, we find that increasing 
vision by .5 does not statistically affect the results compared to the initial model. While as we 
reduce vision by .5, we find all coefficients are statistically significant; however, all the coefficients 
are small which indicates the differences are relatively minimal compared to the initial model. 
While as noted in our descriptive statistics, we find that increase metabolism creates differences 
that are more noticeable. Particularly, increasing metabolism by .5 has a statistically significant 
impact on the percent of altruists (β=.177) and on percent of aggrandizer high (β=-.137). 
Additionally, decreasing metabolism by .5 has a statistically significant impact on the percent of 
aggrandizer low (β=.112) and on the percent of advocates (β=.-.080). Overall, from this sensitivity 
test, we find robust and stable results as we increase and decrease vision; however, we find some 
noticeable differences as we modify metabolism. 
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5. DISCUSSION  
This experiment sought to answer the question, “Which bureaucratic strategies or heuristics for 
capturing resources are most successful under conditions of resource constraints?” The results of 
the simulation showed that the relative mix of bureaucratic types and thus their associated 
heuristics were altered in a resource constrained environment. There were definitive decreases in 
the proportion of Aggrandizing types (Climbers) in our resource constrained landscape. Abiders 
remained as a relatively consistent proportion of bureaucratic types while Advocates who seek only 
minimal increases in their own agency’s budget increased at a rate of 167 percent.  
While Downs’ (1967) and other public choice theorists (Niskanen, 1971) views of public 
bureaucracy peopled by predominantly self-interested agents holds true to some extent under 
conditions of resource constraints, it does not tell the entire story.  Altruists did not show a 
significant change in proportion. Altruists did show great variation in proportion during the 
simulation runs and, at times, were almost eliminated from the landscape. The combination of high 
resource needs and more complex strategic resource acquisition approaches did not succeed in 
engendering more agents to take on these heuristics. Demanding more and engaging in strategic 
manoeuvring is not a bureaucratic type “growth strategy” in this simulated environment.  
The more than doubling of the number of Advocates is the most salient finding from the 
simulation. Advocates’ heuristics maintained a take-the-best approach when seeking out resources 
across the organizational landscape. Advocates also have a low need for resources. And, Advocates 
avoid conflict in the sense that they do not engage in taking resources from other agents. Advocates 
increased their proportion to an extent that they constitute almost one-third of the bureaucratic 
types under conditions of resource constraints.  
Advocates, from Downs’s initial incarnation, do want to influence public policies but lack the level 
of self-aggrandizement typical of Aggrandizers. In our simulation, Advocates seem to succeed and 
increase in numbers by reducing the extent of their search for resource acquisition to the immediate 
environment. This apparently sub-optimal behaviour appears to increase under conditions of 
resource constraints. This understanding raises further questions concerning whether the conditions 
of resource constraints actually enhance the behaviours we would hope for in bureaucrats. It may 
be that resource constraints serve to engender a level of passivity evidenced by a reduction in 
aggrandizement and an increase in Advocates with a take-the-best approach. Resource constraints 
may thus undermine the managerial energy and enthusiasm necessary to achieve the high-
performance organizations so often touted by practitioners. In a broader sense, these results 
diminish Deming’s (1994) call for all organizational actors to be concerned with the system and 
larger organizational values because conditions of resource constraints appear to produce a greater 
focus on agency or unit level concerns. 
Economists have attempted to examine how individuals behave under conditions of resource 
scarcity. Some studies suggest that resource scarcity increases competition (Grossman and 
Mendoza, 2008) implying that in our simulation Aggrandizers should increase in numbers. In short, 
in the case of Aggrandizers their willingness to take resources from others should be an effective 
strategy. Our results showed that such strategies did not result in increasing numbers of this 
competitive type. 
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Another body of literature examining behaviour under conditions of resource scarcity suggests that 
people will attenuate their expectations in concert with the perceived level of resources in the 
environment (Ostrom, 1999). Osés-Eraso and Viladricj-Grau (2007) found that under the 
expectation of resource scarcity actors will restrain their desired appropriations from the resource 
pool. This accommodation strategy, in which actors appear to adjust their desires for resources 
based on their expectations of resource scarcity, may be a key to understanding the findings from 
our simulation.  
The behavioural economics literature exploring how individuals respond to resource scarcity may 
also offer insight into our findings. Shah, Mullainathan and Shafir (2012) show that conditions of 
resource scarcity tend to increase an individual’s focus on salient and immediate challenges. Shah, 
Mullainathan and Shafir (2012, p. 683) also discovered that as increased focus occurs under 
conditions of scarcity an opposing “attentional neglect” results as other matters of import receive 
less attention. This insight adds credibility to our finding that Advocates may increase in numbers, 
under resource constraints, in part, because of their low tendency toward strategic manoeuvring. 
Strategic manoeuvring may simply be less likely when resources are constrained as decision-
makers focus on their own unit’s resources to the neglect of other, perhaps, more important 
strategic concerns. For Advocates, simple attributes involving a very low sense of strategic 
manoeuvring (exemplified by the take-the-best approach), a low need for resources and the 
avoidance of conflict appear as a growth strategy for that bureaucratic type under conditions of 
scare resources. 
The mix of agents in our simulation, using relatively simple attributes, changed in a manner typical 
of what we view as an “accommodationist” strategy. The reduction of the number of self-serving 
Aggrandizers suggests a reduction in the efficacy of strictly self-aggrandizing budgetary strategies 
under conditions of resource constraints. Even the most “climbing” Aggrandizers seem to 
accommodate to an environment of resource constraints. Strategic and high resource need Altruists 
have a highly variable, “bumpy ride” over time and continue as a small proportion of the total 
agent population.  
The decrease in the proportion of Aggrandizers also suggests that the level of conflict may be 
reduced under resource constraints as fewer agents engage in “taking” resources from others. This 
understanding further suggests that rather than the self-seeking, utility maximizing bureaucracy 
described by public choice theorists, that under conditions of resource constraints 
accommodationist dynamics dominate. Aggrandizers remain the largest proportion of actors, but 
conflict is reduced via less “taking” behaviour. In the accommodationist agency, a moderate to low 
need for resources and engagement attributes emphasizing very low to moderate strategic 
manoeuvring results in significant proportions of Aggrandizers, Abider and Advocates. The 
combined proportion of Abiders and Advocates is now larger than that of the Aggrandizers. Since 
neither Abiders nor Advocates are “takers” such potential conflict is reduced throughout the 
bureau. Under conditions of resource scarcity taking from others loses its dominance. 
We do not envision the decline in Aggrandizing behaviour as signalling a stagnant or declining 
bureaucracy as suggested by Downs (1967, p. 13). Accommodationist strategies appear to expand 
under resource constraints as bureaucrats adapt to their financial environs. We may be living in an 
historical era in which boundedly rational actors have accommodated themselves to a resource 
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constrained environment in which relatively narrow boundaries of concern dominate bureaucratic 
strategies. 
In his classic study of the evolution of cooperation Axelrod (1997, p. 6) noted that “models that 
aim to explore fundamental processes should be judged by their fruitfulness, not by their 
accuracy.” The simulation presented here cannot present a complete picture of the dynamics of 
budgetary acquisition, but it does provide a readily accessible and, we think fruitful, window into 
the dynamics of the individual-environment interaction and the simple attributes that may be 
employed. It is not a novel insight to suggest that humans attempt to adapt, or to accommodate, to 
their environments. Our results more than validate this point. Yet, if we are to fully grasp 
bureaucratic behaviour we must understand that the individual-interaction is an essential piece of 
that puzzle. Whether we view bureaucratic behaviour from the lens of the public choice approach 
or that of public service motivation the behaviour of bureaucratic actors must be seen with regard 
to how the motivational sets of individuals interact with environmental circumstances to drive 
organizational dynamics. 
From the practitioners’ perspective, such simulation methods may serve as means to anticipate the 
dynamics of organizational initiatives based on assumptions of bureaucratic types and the 
heuristics managers apply to navigate their environs. Such agent-based models may also begin to 
fulfil Holland’s (1995) recommendation for organizational flight simulators by providing a means 
to examine the parameters of expected organizational behaviours (Lewin, Parker & Regine, 1998). 
Thus, agent-based modelling would in Downs’ words (1967, p. 4) “…enable us to make forecasts 
about the behaviour of officials and bureaus that will hopefully prove more accurate than forecasts 
made with alternative forms.”  
6. CONCLUSIONS  
Public administration and public choice theorists have sought for decades to understand the 
motivations of bureaucratic agents regarding the acquisition of budgetary resources.  Public choice 
theorists have tended to assume classic microeconomic utility maximization models, as 
exemplified by Downs (1967) and Niskanen (1971).  Bureaucrats, in other words, behaved in a 
manner consistent with firms in the competitive marketplace.  Other scholars, however (Dolan, 
2000; Bowling, Cho, and Wright 2004; Moynihan 2013) have found that bureaucratic strategies are 
more heterogeneous and varied than what one would expect under traditional public choice 
assumptions.  Based upon the work of Bowling, Cho, and Wright, we have created an agent-based 
model that tests the efficacy of different budgetary strategies in resource constrained environments.  
We choose this particular context given the fact that budgetary constraints have tended to be the 
dominant fact of life for public managers for the last several decades. 
Our model assumes that boundedly rational bureaucratic agents possess heterogeneous strategies 
that rely upon simple heuristic “cognitive maps.”  These heuristics tend to be relatively stable; 
moreover, their actions are governed by simple attribute sets consisting of the three elements (a) 
“taking the best” versus strategic manoeuvring, (b) agents’ relative resource needs and (c) the 
willingness to take resources from other agents.  These results suggest strategies focused on a 
preference for short-term goals, a low need for resources and a lack of willingness to expropriate 
resources from other agents dominate other strategies.  These heuristics for acquiring resources 
lead to what we label accommodationist strategies. To be sure, our model may not apply in other 
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circumstances, and indeed, an important element of future research is to examine the efficacy of 
our model in other resource contexts.  Moreover, future research should allow for learning to take 
place so that individual agents can adapt their behaviour.  While we believe a good case can be 
made in this first effort to explore the dynamics of resource constrained agents, it is also clear that 
incorporating learning will provide additional insights.  In fact, it would be useful to explore 
models in which heterogeneous agents learn and adapt at different rates.  Nonetheless, we believe 
this study has demonstrated the useful and important role of agent-based modelling in providing 
new insights into bureaucratic behaviour 
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APPENDIX (1) 
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